In short
Ronald Dworkin (1931 to 2013) was Hart’s leading critic. In Taking Rights Seriously (1977) he argued that law consists not only of rules but also of principles, standards of justice and fairness that judges must apply even when no rule covers the case. So judges do not have strong discretion in hard cases: there is usually a right answer. In Law’s Empire (1986) he developed law as integrity: judges should interpret the law as a coherent whole, choosing the reading that both fits past legal decisions and shows them in their best moral light, as an ideal judge he called Hercules would do.
On this page 8 sections
- How do rules differ from principles?
- Why did Dworkin reject Hart's theory of discretion?
- What is law as integrity?
- Can Dworkin's approach be seen in Tanzanian courts?
- What are the main criticisms of Dworkin?
- Exam focus: what do examiners test on Dworkin?
- Practice question: "Judges in hard cases make law." Discuss with reference to Hart and Dworkin.
- Key takeaways
How do rules differ from principles?
| Rules | Principles |
|---|---|
| Apply in an all-or-nothing fashion: if valid and applicable, they decide the case | Have a dimension of weight: they point in a direction and must be balanced |
| A conflict between rules is resolved by holding one invalid or creating an exception | Conflicting principles both survive; one outweighs the other in a particular case |
| Identified by their source (pedigree) | Identified by their moral content and institutional support |
| Example: a will needs two witnesses | Example: no one may profit from his own wrong |
Dworkin’s best-known illustration was a 19th-century case in which a grandson murdered his grandfather to inherit under his will. The statute on wills, read literally, gave him the estate, but the court refused to let him take it, relying on the principle that no one may profit from his own wrong. English law reached the same result through the forfeiture rule: in In re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89, a son who murdered his mother could not take her estate on intestacy, though the statute’s words seemed to entitle him.
Why did Dworkin reject Hart’s theory of discretion?
- If law is only rules identified by a rule of recognition, then where rules run out judges must make new law. Dworkin argued that this misdescribes what judges do: they argue about what the law already requires, using principles.
- Principles cannot be identified by pedigree alone, so Hart’s rule of recognition cannot capture all of the law.
- Judicial law-making in hard cases would be retroactive and undemocratic; finding rights already implicit in the law is not.
- Dworkin distinguished principles (about individual rights) from policies (about collective goals). Courts should decide hard cases on principle; policy is for the legislature.
Key Statutes and Cases on Dworkin and Law as Integrity
Statutes
- Law of Marriage Act, Cap. 29s. 114 division of matrimonial assets acquired by joint efforts
Cases
- In re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89No one may profit from his own wrong (forfeiture rule)
- Bi Hawa Mohamed v Ally Sefu, [1983] TZCA 1Domestic work counts as joint effort
- Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo v Attorney General, [2002] TZCA 14Broad and purposive constitutional interpretation
- Director of Public Prosecutions v Daudi Pete, [1991] TZCA 1Statutes read in the light of constitutional rights
Test yourself
Dworkin and Law as Integrity Quiz
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