Civil Procedure notes · Topic 3 of 20

Parties to a Suit

Who can sue and be sued, joinder of parties, representative suits, and how capacity (minors, the Government) affects civil litigation in Tanzania.

  • Isack Kimaro, LL.B, PDLPBy Isack Kimaro, LL.B, PDLP
  • Reviewed
  • 42 min read

Every civil suit needs at least two opposing sides — the plaintiff, who claims a legal right against another, and the defendant, who is alleged to have infringed that right. The law on parties tells you who can take each role, how more than one person can join a single suit, what happens when the wrong people are joined or the right people are left out, how a defendant can drag in someone the plaintiff did not sue, and how a person who cannot conduct litigation personally — a minor, a person of unsound mind, a corporation — can act through someone else.

This topic carries unusual weight in practice because most preliminary objections at the early stages of a suit are about parties: that the plaintiff has no locus standi, that a necessary party is missing, that the plaintiff who issued the plaint had no authority, that a corporation appeared without an advocate, that a representative suit was filed without the required representation order, or that a third-party notice was issued where no claim for indemnity or contribution exists. A student who masters the rules in Order I and Order III of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023, with the leading cases, walks into the exam with a working tool that examiners reward and that the courts apply daily.

For the structure of this topic the student should keep three groupings clearly in mind. The first is the classification of parties — proper, necessary, and (where it arises) formal. The second is the mechanics of multiple parties — joinder of plaintiffs and defendants, mis-joinder and non-joinder, substitution, representative suits, and third-party procedure. The third is the representation of parties — who may appear in court for whom, including recognised agents, advocates, and legal representatives of those who cannot represent themselves. The discussion below follows that order.

Meaning / Definition

A party to a suit is a person — and “person” includes natural persons, registered companies, partnerships sued in the firm name, and other legal entities — who is named on the record as either claiming relief or against whom relief is claimed. The plaintiff is the party who institutes the suit and asserts a legal right that he alleges to have been infringed. The defendant is the party against whom the suit is instituted and who is alleged to have infringed that legal right. The right the plaintiff asserts must be a legal right enforceable in law — not a moral right and not merely a sense of grievance.

In an appellate matter, the party who lodges the appeal is the appellant and the party against whom the appeal is brought is the respondent. In any incidental application within a suit — for example, an application by the defendant to transfer the suit to another court — the party making the application is the applicant and the party who resists it is the respondent. These labels matter because the rules of procedure attach different rights and obligations to each.

A useful working notion underlies the law on parties: in every civil dispute there must be a lis inter partes (a contested dispute between parties) capable of litis contestatio (a joinder of issue). Without a real, contested dispute between identifiable parties, there is no suit for the court to decide.

Types / Classifications of Parties

The CPC, together with the case law, recognises two principal categories of parties: necessary parties and proper parties. The distinction is heavily examined and is also tested through problem questions where one of the obvious candidates has been left out of the suit.

Necessary party

A necessary party is one without whom the court cannot effectively and completely determine the dispute or grant the relief sought. The presence of a necessary party on the record is indispensable. If a necessary party is left out, the court is generally unable to issue an effective decree at all, because the person whose conduct or rights are at the heart of the case is simply not before the court.

To take the classic textbook illustration: in a suit about a flow of sewage causing a nuisance, the person physically responsible — for instance a tenant in occupation — may not be the only relevant person; the landlord, who actually controls the property and can be ordered to fix the source of the nuisance, may be the person against whom the effective decree must run. The landlord, in such a case, is the necessary party because the decree must operate against him to be effective. The tenant is in some scenarios a proper party but not a necessary one.

Proper party

A proper party is one whose presence in court is desirable for the proper and complete adjudication of the matter, but whose absence does not render the decree ineffective. A proper party is sometimes a person who is not interested in the precise relief sought between the principal parties but whose presence helps the court resolve all related issues in one go. In the classic landlord-tenant-subtenant scenario, where the landlord sues the tenant for possession, the subtenant has no interest in the relief between the landlord and the tenant but may want to be present to know the outcome that will affect his own occupation. The subtenant is a proper party; the tenant is the necessary party.

The practical test for the student is to ask: “Can the court grant the relief without this person?” If yes, the person is at most a proper party. If no, the person is necessary, and the suit may fail unless he or she is brought before the court.

Statutory Provisions on Joinder of Parties

The general framework for joinder of parties is in Order I of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023. The provisions worth remembering by name are these. Order I Rule 1 allows joinder of plaintiffs. Order I Rule 3 allows joinder of defendants. Order I Rule 6 allows the plaintiff, at his option, to join as parties all or any of the persons jointly or severally liable on a contract, including parties to bills of exchange, hundies, and promissory notes. Order I Rule 7 addresses the plaintiff who is in doubt as to whom he should sue — he may join two or more defendants so the court can decide who is actually liable. Order I Rule 8 governs representative suits. Order I Rule 9 addresses the consequences of mis-joinder and non-joinder. Order I Rule 10 governs the substitution, addition, and striking out of parties. Order I Rule 12 allows a single party to plead and conduct the case on behalf of co-parties. Order I Rule 13 prescribes the time for raising objections to mis-joinder and non-joinder. Order I Rule 14 governs third-party procedure. The detailed handling of each follows below.

Joinder of plaintiffs (Order I Rule 1)

Two or more persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where the right to relief claimed by them, jointly or severally, arises out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions, and where, if separate suits were brought, a common question of law or fact would arise. The two limbs are cumulative: there must be a common transaction and a common question.

The leading East African authority adopted in Tanzania is Yohana Kahere (Yowana Kahere) v Lonjal (Lunjo) Estates Ltd [1959] EA 319, where eight tenants of the same landlord joined together as co-plaintiffs in a single suit. Each tenant had a separate tenancy contract; their grievances were different — some claimed unlawful eviction, others claimed destruction of property by the landlord, others alleged breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, and some were still in occupation. The court held that, because the right to relief did not arise out of the same transaction and because each tenancy stood on its own, there was no proper joinder of plaintiffs. The suit was struck out for improper joinder. The lesson is that a shared dissatisfaction with the same defendant is not enough; what is required is a unifying transaction and a common question that the court can decide once for all the plaintiffs.

The other classic East African authority is Bolton v Salim Kambi [1958] EA 360, where the plaintiff sued in a dual capacity — on his own behalf as the dependant of his deceased son under the relevant fatal accidents legislation, and at the same time as the administrator of the deceased son’s estate. The court held that there was nothing wrong with a single person suing in two capacities provided each cause of action was clearly pleaded. The case shows that the rules on joinder are concerned with whether the claims belong together, not with how many roles a single person plays.

The practical considerations the prudent advocate weighs before joining co-plaintiffs include the following. The co-plaintiffs must have a genuinely common interest in the subject matter; where interests are likely to diverge, separate suits are safer. Co-plaintiffs should ordinarily be represented by the same advocate, otherwise prejudice may arise. Joinder generally shortens the litigation and reduces costs because witnesses are mobilised once and the issues are tried together. Joinder also avoids the awkward result that a defendant successful against some but not all of the plaintiffs may find himself jointly liable to those who succeed.

Joinder of defendants (Order I Rule 3)

A plaintiff may join two or more defendants in one suit where the right to relief alleged against them arises out of the same act or transaction, and where, if separate suits were brought against them, a common question of law or fact would arise. It is not necessary that every defendant be interested in every relief claimed; what is required is a connecting transaction and a common question.

The position is illustrated by the East African authority Peter Company Ltd v Mangalji & Others [1964] EA 80, which applied the joinder-of-defendants rule, and by The Bank of India v Ambal Shah & Others [1965] EA 18, where the court reiterated that, although the word “same” governs the words “series of acts or transactions,” it is not necessary that all defendants be interested in the same relief — what is required is a cause of action in which all the defendants are more or less interested, although the relief claimed against each may vary.

The classical common-law statement of the same principle is Thomas v Moore [1918] 1 KB 555, in which Lawrence J held that, where claims by or against different parties involve or may involve a common question of fact of sufficient importance in proportion to the rest of the action, the court will in its discretion allow the joinder. Joinder of parties is therefore discretionary: parties have no automatic right either to be joined or to have a joinder struck out — the court decides what best serves the determination of the real matter in dispute.

A practical example, drawn from the East African case law, illustrates the rule. A plaintiff sues B, C, D, and E for the recovery of documents of title and the goods to which they relate. He alleges that B obtained the documents from him by fraud and passed them to C, that C wrongfully dealt with them and sold the goods to D and E, and that D and E claim to retain them. The right to relief against each defendant ultimately rests on the alleged fraud of B; the subsequent dealings by C and the purchases by D and E flow from the same act. Even though each defendant may have a distinct defence, separate suits would all turn, at least in part, on the same question of fact — what B actually did. The joinder of all four defendants in one suit is proper and saves the parties from repeating the same investigation in four separate trials.

The general principles applying to joinder of parties were also stated in Hornood (Harnood) v Statesman Publishing Co. Ltd (1929) [the contemporaneous reports], which East African courts have adopted: the court has discretion to allow joinder where there is a common question of fact or law involved in different causes of action of sufficient importance in proportion to the rest of the action. The principle was applied in East Africa in Abdullah and Another v The Official Receiver (1954) EACA 84, which adopted the common-law approach and emphasised the court’s discretion to permit or refuse joinder.

The doubtful defendant — Order I Rule 7

Sometimes the plaintiff knows that one of several persons is liable but cannot, without litigation, tell which one. Order I Rule 7 provides for this. Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may join two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of them is liable, and to what extent, may be determined between all of them in a single suit. The rule looks odd at first reading — the plaintiff appears to be allowed to sue a defendant he is not sure is liable — but on closer reading the connection to the cause of action must still be shown. A plaintiff cannot use Rule 7 to drag a stranger into the suit.

A plaintiff who joins under Rule 7 takes a costs risk: a defendant ultimately found not liable may be entitled to costs against the plaintiff. The Tanzanian and East African courts handle this through one of two costs orders, both important to know.

A Bullock order is an order that the plaintiff pay the costs of the unsuccessful defendant, with liberty to recover those costs from the successful defendant or other defendants found liable. The plaintiff effectively pays in the first instance but recovers from the losing side.

A Sanderson order goes further: the court orders the unsuccessful defendant or defendants — the ones found actually liable — to pay the costs of the defendants who were sued under Rule 7 but found not liable. The plaintiff never has to pay those costs at all.

The choice between Bullock and Sanderson depends on the facts and the court’s view of who properly bears the cost of the doubt. The advocate’s takeaway is that Rule 7 is useful but not free — the plaintiff should be ready to justify joining each defendant and to argue, on costs, for a Sanderson order in his favour.

Mis-joinder and Non-joinder of Parties

Two opposite mistakes are possible in framing a suit: either joining someone who should not be in (mis-joinder) or leaving out someone who should be (non-joinder).

Mis-joinder of parties occurs where the suit contains persons who do not properly belong in it — for example, several plaintiffs are joined whose claims do not arise out of the same transaction and have no common question, or several defendants are joined where the rights to relief claimed against them arise from different and independent transactions. Yohana Kahere v Lonjal Estates Ltd [1959] EA 319, discussed above, is a classic case of mis-joinder of plaintiffs; the suit was struck out because the tenants’ claims were independent. Barclays Bank v Patel [1959] EA 214 is the standard example of mis-joinder of defendants: two guarantors had each guaranteed a different defendant under separate, independent contracts of guarantee; when the bank sued both guarantors together, the court held that, because the guarantees were independent and arose from different transactions, the guarantors could not be joined in a single suit. The case was withdrawn and refiled separately against each guarantor.

Non-joinder of parties occurs where the suit is filed without a person who should have been included — for example, the plaintiff sues only one of several joint contractors, or leaves out a necessary party such as the landlord in a nuisance case. As a general rule, non-joinder of defendants is not fatal; the plaintiff is free under Order I Rule 7 to choose whom to sue, and the maxim of practice is to sue the defendant with “deep pocket” — the defendant who can satisfy the decree. Non-joinder of plaintiffs is also generally not fatal where the absent plaintiffs are merely proper rather than necessary parties.

Key Statutes and Cases on Parties to a Suit

Statutes

  • Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2023Order I parties; s. 105 inherent powers
  • Advocates Act, Cap. 341 R.E. 2023s. 3 meaning of advocate

Cases

  • Lujuna Shubi Ballonzi, Senior v Registered Trustees of Chama cha Mapinduzi [1996] TLR 203 (HC)Locus standi: a plaintiff must show a right or interest of his own that has been interfered with

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